Exile and Translation by Bartoloni, Paolo
Literature  & Aesthetics 17(2) December 2007, page 131 
Exile and Translation
Paolo Bartoloni 
Introduction
A major current of Western philosophical and literary thought, including 
seminal ﬁgures such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot, has argued 
that a new experience of ontology and language must pass via a deliberate 
renunciation and suspension of conventionally accepted approaches to 
being and language. If this is correct, a re-conceptualisation of exile and 
translation as potential paths towards suspending habitual experiences 
of being and language might be of signiﬁcant value. This article provides 
preliminary insights into a reconﬁguration of translation as that process 
which enables an alternative use of language. It contends that by entering 
into the process of translation, the author enacts an implicit or explicit, 
voluntary or involuntary, act of exile from the familiar which may bring 
about an experience of estrangement and suspension, the outcomes of 
which can be revelatory. It is perhaps something like this that the Italian poet 
Giorgio Caproni went through when he translated from the French; famously 
stating that translation had taught him to speak “more gently to things”. 
This article traces the possible meanings of this learned “gentleness”, and 
the potentially considerable role played by translation to achieve it, through 
a discussion of directly related literary and philosophical concerns.
I
If it is true, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, that writing is an “immobile 
voyage” (1986: 35), and that in writing the traveller defers the journey 
by actually departing, enacting a movement, translation is, then, the 
quintessential evidence of a journey that “goes where one isn’t”. (1994: 254) 
The “going where one isn’t” means to ﬁll a gap through writing or, in the 
words of Ann Smock, to “bridge a gulf that does not, for all that, become 
passable.” (2003: 31) 
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This impossible going is a writerly journey whose ultimate purpose 
is, in the words of Franz Kafka, to get “away from here, just away from 
here (nur weg von hier). On and on away from here, that’s the only way 
I can reach my goal (nur so kann ich mein Ziel erreichen).” (1991: 137) It is 
also, as Giorgio Caproni put it so admirably, a returning where we have 
never been: “I returned there/ where I had never been./ Nothing, from 
how it was not, has changed./ On the table (the checkered/ cloth), half 
ﬁlled/ I found the glass/ never ﬁlled. Everything/ is still as/ I have never 
left it.” (1992: 81) But exactly what does “to return where we have never 
been” mean?
II
The beginning of productive creativity correlates with, and is 
complemented by a sense of astonishment in the face of what is taking 
place before one’s eyes and in the language that lends tangibility to 
production. 
In Was ist das – die Philosophie? (What is Philosophy?), Martin Heidegger 
deﬁnes astonishment thus: “In astonishment (im Erstaunen) we restrain 
ourselves (être en arrêt). We step back, as it were, from being (Wir treten 
gleichsam zurück vor dem Seienden), from the fact that it is as it is and not 
otherwise.” (1963: 85) It is at once philosophically signiﬁcant and poetic 
that Heidegger chose to deﬁne astonishment as an act of self-restraint 
where restraint, and here lies the beauty and the importance of this 
statement, is the active refusal to accept that which is pre-arranged and 
pre-ordained, pre-packaged, arbitrarily complete. Heidegger invites us 
instead to break this artiﬁcial, un-philosophical and un-poetical reading 
of life, to destroy it in order to pave the way, the path, to seeing it and to 
saying it “otherwise” (anders).
In the same book, Heidegger speaks of destruction (Destruktion) in 
a way that leaves no doubt about his understanding of the meaning 
of philosophising. “Destruction”, writes Heidegger, “does not mean 
destroying but dismantling, demolishing, putting to one side the merely 
historical assertions about the history of philosophy (Destruktion bedeutet 
nicht Zerstören, sondern Abbauen, Abtragen und Auf-die-Seite-stellen). 
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Destruction means – to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what 
speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being (Sein des Seienden). By 
listening to this interpellation (Indem wir auf diesen Zuspruch hören) we 
attain the correspondence (die Entsprechung).”(1963: 73) 
III
Most of modern production (the language of modernity) is predicated 
upon the notions of suspension and destruction, and upon the creative 
power of ambiguity and antinomy. Modernity is, in other words, 
concerned with and indeed informed by the notion of exile. Examples 
abound. Discussing the work of Charles Baudelaire, in Infancy and 
History Agamben claimed that: “In Baudelaire a man expropriated from 
experience (espropriato dell’esperienza) exposes himself to the force of shock. 
Poetry responds to the expropriation of experience by converting this 
expropriation into a reason for surviving and making the inexperiencible 
its normal condition (facendo dell’inesperibile la sua condizione normale). In 
this perspective, the search for the ‘new’ (nuovo) does not appear as the 
search for a new object of experience; instead, it implies an eclipse and a 
suspension of experience (implica al contrario, un’eclisse e una sospensione 
dell’esperienza).” (2001: 38) 
But what exactly does “a suspension of experience” mean, and more 
importantly, what kind of language and literature are “a language and a 
literature of suspension”? 
It is worth reﬂecting further on Agamben’s emphasis on the suspension 
of experience. In chapter three of Infancy and History, under the sub-
heading La poesia moderna e l’esperienza (“Modern Poetry and Experience”), 
we read:
… modern poetry from Baudelaire onwards is seen to be founded not on new 
experience, but on an unprecedented lack of experience (una mancanza di 
esperienza senza precedenti). Hence the boldness (disinvoltura) with which 
Baudelaire can place shock at the centre of his artistic work. It is experience 
that best affords us protection from surprises (protezione dalle sorprese), 
and the production of shock always implies a gap (falla) in experience. To 
experience something means divesting it of novelty (novità), neutralizing its 
shock potential (neutralizzare il suo potenziale di choc). (2001: 37) 
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The word “shock” occupies a central and commanding position in this 
important passage. It appears to be in close relation to “surprise”, and 
opposed to experience. “Shock” is the “surprise” that upsets experience 
and relegates experience to the background, puts it out of sight, renders 
it useless and impracticable. It is not that experience disappears because 
of exposure to “shock”. Rather, experience becomes devoid of meaning, 
empty, voiceless. It speaks no more, and with its silence comes the nakedness 
of the subject. 
By nakedness we mean here the simple event of being devoid of 
experience, which in turn means that moment devoid of historiography, 
that abyss so vital to the thinking of Heidegger and Blanchot, the present-
now (Jetzt-Zeit) to which Benjamin devotes so many pages and so much 
thought. In other words, by nakedness we mean here the suspension of 
existence by virtue of which existence manifests itself as existence as-
such. In his study entitled Sur Nietzsche (On Nietzche), Georges Bataille 
deﬁnes nakedness as the space of inaction or the suspension of action. 
He writes: “If I give up the viewpoint of action, my perfect nakedness is 
revealed to me.” (2004: xvii) Two pages later he adds: “Art constitutes a 
minor free zone outside action, paying for its freedom by giving up the 
real world.”(2004: xxix) 
In Benjamin’s Arcades Project, in the chapter on the ﬂâneur, we read: 
“Truth becomes something living; it lives solely in the rhythm by which 
statement and counterstatement displace each other in order to think each 
other.” (1999: 418) Living truth is nothing other, then, than naked truth; 
the truth that exists as it confronts the shock of its own existence. What 
is extraordinary about Benjamin’s thought is its emphasis on life beyond 
the ordinary conception of life, and of existence beyond the common 
understanding of existence. 
IV
How does this relate to the present discussion of exile and 
translation? 
In a short essay discussing his translation of Céline’s Mort à credit, ﬁrst 
published in the literary journal Il Verri in the January-February issue of 
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1968, and re-published almost thirty years later in the collection of essays 
La scatola nera (The Black Box), Giorgio Caproni writes that translation 
has taught him to “parler […] plus doucement aux choses (“to speak more 
gently to things”).” (1996: 58, my translation) The signiﬁcance of this 
statement is considerable, especially in the light of the central position 
given to the preposition aux (to), around which the meaning of the 
sentence revolves. Caproni claims that translation has enabled him to 
talk to things, and not about things. This form of speech, of writing, is not 
indirect, is not descriptive or representational. It is rather an encounter 
and an intersection in language. Translation leads Caproni to a territory 
where “thingness”, that is, both the subject of speech and its interlocutor 
and listener, are united by that language-event that does not speak 
about. In other words, the experience of being exposed to the presence 
of the non-linguistic does not happen through language but in language. 
Language is therefore no longer a means but more precisely, and certainly 
more poignantly, the end and the very locus of shared life. The “gentle 
speaking to things” is that climactic moment at which the subject arrives at 
its maximal unconcealment and openness, pouring itself out in language, 
simultaneously uttering its whole vulnerability by willingly sharing it with 
the life around it. And life responds to these bouts of utter exposure (of 
destruction) through its consent to listen and its devoted attention. 
This is the language of Ponge and Pascoli and of those poets and writers 
for whom language becomes life. It is a paradox and also an irony that 
the recognition of language as life is conﬁned to poetry and madness, 
to those “anarchic” experiences which are treated either with suspicion, 
indifference and disdain or, in a contrary manner, with unconsidered 
and often incongruous enthusiasm. It is doubly puzzling that life must 
renounce its juridical status to regain its fullness. But  this is precisely what 
Caproni claims as a result of his reﬂections on translation. He can speak 
“more gently to things” because he has exposed himself to the experience 
of linguistic exile. And translation is the door to linguistic exile. 
V
The mistake that is often made about translation – and to a certain 
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extent about the notion of exile, too – is that translating consigns the 
translator to another language and culture. In translating, the translator, 
who already knows well – or reasonably well – the language and the 
culture that s/he translates from, will gain an even better and deeper 
knowledge of that language and culture. What is less often discussed is 
that in translating, which means continually exiting and re-entering one’s 
own language and culture, the translator gains a deeper understanding of 
his/her own language and culture, and of his/her own life. The translator 
can, as in the case of Caproni, experience language as life. In taking the 
self out of its known boundaries, the self comes to know itself better. 
It is in this sense that departing, never imply a return to the same but 
rather a discovery of new and unfamiliar territories which are nonetheless 
already inside the self. This also means that leaving can the best way to 
stay in one’s own company, and the most precious gift that one can make 
to oneself. If it is true, as Adriana Cavarero argues in Tu che mi guardi, tu 
che mi racconti [1997] (Relating Narratives, 2000), that auto/biographical 
stories catch the essence of the unique identity of a person through the 
necessary process of relation with another who tells or listens to the stories, 
then it is also true that translation, the relational narrative par excellence, is 
another essential path to discovery. It was in translating René Char that 
Caproni realised that:
La letteratura e la poesia-che-si-sapeva-già non porgono più alcun soccorso 
al lettore, e questi, coinvolto da capo a piedi in quei bouts d’existence 
incorruptible che sono i poèmes, rimane perfettamente solo a sentirsi 
investito d’un potere – d’un interiore libertà: d’uno slancio vitale e d’un 
coraggio morale – che per un istante egli crede di ricevere femminilmente 
dall’esterno, mentre poi s’accorge che tale ricchezza era già in lui, 
sonnecchiante ma presente, come se il poeta altro non avesse fatto che 
risvegliarla, non inventando, ma scoprendo; e quindi suscitando un moto, 
più che d’ammirazione, di gratitudine. (1996: 61, emphasis in the text) 
(The literature and the poetry-one-already-knew no longer offer any help 
to the reader, who, caught up from head to toe in those bouts d’existence 
incorruptibles that are the poèmes, is left entirely alone to feel himself 
invested with a power – an inner freedom: a vital energy and moral courage 
– which for a moment he thinks he receives femininely from the outside, 
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until he realizes that this richness was already in him, slumbering but 
present, as if the poet had done nothing other than to reawaken it, not 
inventing, but discovering; and so exciting an impulse, more than of 
admiration, of gratitude. Translation by Joseph Falsone)
We ﬁnd in this passage many of the things discussed so far. And yet, 
these “things” are illuminated by a clarity (nitidezza) and precision that 
demand attention. Translation is not only an exile from the usual (from 
“the literature and the poetry-one-already-knew”), it is also an exile into 
the self where the consent to listen, indeed the consent to receive the 
other as part of the self, wakens an ethical courage and a passion living 
dormant, neglected and uncertain. The richness of the self can be found in 
the dialectic relation with the other, and this richness is not an invention, a 
creation from nothing. It is rather a discovery which is nothing other than 
the result of a process of disorientation and defamiliarisation. 
Caproni could not be more explicit when, quoting from Char, he 
stresses that “Celui qui invente, au contraire de celui qui découvre, n’ajoute 
aux choses, n’apporte aux êtres que des masques…” (“Those who invent, by 
contrast to those who discover, do not add to things, they only endow 
beings with masks…”) (1996: 62, my translation) The central argument 
is that the poet (Caproni) comes to understand what he believes is the 
real essence of art through translation. The notion that nothing is actually 
created, and that artistic creation is a process of discovery, casts new light 
on the idea of originality and purity, and also on the relation between 
the original and the translation. A redeﬁnition of poetic exile, but also of 
translation, must commence from this premise.
VI
In 1964 Italo Calvino married Esther Judith Singer and took up 
residence in Paris. From that year till 1980, Calvino commuted more or 
less regularly between France and Italy. And yet, for about sixteen years 
his home was Paris; a home that for Calvino also signiﬁed poetic exile. In 
one of the few autobiographical pieces on those years, the essay “Eremita 
a Parigi” (“Hermit in Paris”), Calvino writes thus: “I often say, and I have 
said it so often that I have now become a bit bored with it, that in Paris 
I have my country house (la mia casa di campagna), in the sense that as a 
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writer I can conduct part of my activity in solitude, it does not matter 
where, in a house isolated in the midst of the country-side, or on an island, 
and this country house of mine is right in the middle of Paris. In this way, 
while the part of my life that is connected with my work (la vita di relazione 
connessa col mio lavoro) takes place entirely in Italy, I come here when I can 
or have to be on my own (quando posso o devo stare da solo), something that 
is easier for me to do in Paris.” (2003: 169) 
A clear analogy would be James Joyce’s self-exile from Ireland in 
order to create the bold experimental prose of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. 
This is the poetic and philosophical exile that writers and philosophers 
impose on themselves to escape the distraction of day-to-day life in order 
to concentrate on a search whose ultimate goal is to present them with 
an image, a form, or just a glimpse or a feeling of what they know exists 
but remains invisible, missing, out of reach. The author must abandon life 
in the community, those distractions such as business, marriage, family 
and daily chores, to prepare, facilitate and arrange an encounter with the 
ever present unknown and unfamiliar, whatever this might be: God, the 
unconscious, the Platonic ideas, love, imagination, death or the pure and 
unfettered nothingness. 
But why is it that in the Western literary and philosophical tradition 
the search for the ultimate truth, or even for the ultimate negation of 
universal truths, must take place in isolation, in the ﬂight, as Plotinus 
had it, “of one into oneself”? 
As Calvino reﬂects on the reason why he has not written about Paris, 
he muses that: “Maybe to write about Paris I ought to leave, to distance 
myself from it (dovrei staccarmene, esserne lontano), if it is true that all writing 
starts out from a lack or an absence (se è vero che si scrive sempre partendo 
da una mancanza, da un’assenza).” (2003: 167) What is of interest in this 
passage, especially for the present discussion, is Calvino’s ﬁnal hypothesis 
that all writing “starts out from a lack or an absence”. If we now combine 
the ﬁrst and the second quotation from “Hermit in Paris” we ﬁnd that 
Calvino says two things. He says that the desire, the will and the impulse 
to write is generated from a sense of loss and that this writing about the 
loss must be attended by the imposition of a further loss. The latter is the 
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abandonment of the quotidian, and the quotidian self. It literally means 
closing the door to life with others in order to enter the rooms of a life 
where the only relations are those played out within the isolated self. 
VII
Calvino closes the door. And yet, this door (which Kafka allegorised so 
powerfully in the story “Vor dem Gesetz” [“Before the Law”]), ought to be 
left open at all times, regardless of whether we are on this or that side of 
the door, and whether we are invited or forbidden to pass through it. But 
the Western tradition, as Calvino testiﬁes, has kept on closing and opening 
the door. Only from time to time has the door been left open. It is indeed 
possible that the Western literary and philosophical tradition, starting 
from Plato, is based on a fundamental mistake, or perhaps on a simple 
and yet damaging misunderstanding. The loss upon which the production 
of language and thought is predicated is the cause and the result of this 
very production and its inherent exclusiveness and closure. It is by closing 
the door of existence that the loss is inevitably and artiﬁcially created. By 
assuming that what is lost must be looked for in exile, the principle that 
there would not be an absence without exile must also be accepted. 
As a matter of fact, exile is not a means toward an end, it is rather the 
inevitable and inescapable condition of historical and cultural existence. 
By artiﬁcially producing loss, we merely reproduce what we already are, 
and as such we do not “add” anything, in the sense that Char gives to the 
notion of “adding”, we only place masks on what is already there. If it is 
true that creation is not invention but discovery, the door of existence must 
be left open. This is the great challenge for contemporary thought. 
It is because of this that the writings and the languages on and of 
the threshold, the great example of which is translation, may initiate an 
alternative articulation of experience as well as ontology.
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